Tax mandates and factor input use: Theory and evidence from Italy by Revelli, Federico
Università degli Studi di Torino
This is an author version of the contribution published on:
Questa è la versione dellautore dellopera:
Tax Mandates and Factor Input Use: Theory and Evidence from
Italy
FinanzArchiv / Public Finance Analysis vol. 71 no. 3, pp. 328-359
Federico Revelli
The denitive version is available at:
La versione denitiva è disponibile alla URL:
https://www.mohr.de/en/journals/nanzarchiv-public-nance-analysis-fa
1
1 Introduction
The late 2000s saw such a dramatic deterioration of the budgets of local gov-
ernments across Europe as to raise doubts about the success of announced scal
austerity and international rescue programs (European Central Bank, 2011;
Lojsch, Rodriguez-Vives and Slavik, 2011). Amongst Southern European coun-
tries, the sudden worsening of Portugals budget gures towards the end of
2011 was partly due to the emergence of extensive local government nancial
distress, with the small island of Madeira alone disclosing a spectacular debt of
over e6 billion.1 In Spain, regional governments had their debts almost doubled
during the nancial crisis, with large autonomous communities like Catalonia
systematically overshooting their decit targets and forcing central government
to impose quarterly budget reporting.2
In Italy, economic growth slowdown and nationwide scal consolidation poli-
cies posed a threat on the sustainability of regional governmentsnances. In
spite of the profound reforms of the regional revenue raising structure that took
place between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the terms of the nancial
relationship between the state and the regions remained opaque, deepening the
soft budget constraint problem and generating unprecedented decit gures in
the subsequent years. The release, after the 2005 nationwide regional elections,
of sensational data on the debt accumulated over the latest terms of o¢ ce in a
number of regions led the state to mandate increases in regional own tax rates in
order to have the burden of debt recovery fall onto those regionstaxpayers. In
particular, the regional business income tax rate - an origin based net income-
type value added tax on all business activities - increased by state command by
one percentage point in decit-running regions in 2007, with further mandated
rate increases following into the regions that were not complying with the agreed
upon scal consolidation plans.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the e¤ects of such centrally
mandated local tax increases on the use of factor inputs in local production
processes. I rst model factor input use within a multi-jurisdiction neoclassical
model, where, as in Cooley, Hansen and Prescott (1995), the aggregate pro-
duction function in each of a number of localities exhibits constant returns to
scale in plant locations, physical capital, and labor, and where physical capital
requires energy in xed proportions depending on the size of energy-saving cap-
ital that is installed along with physical capital (Diaz, Puch and Guillo, 2004).
Energy-saving capital can either be interpreted as tangible IT (information tech-
nology) equipment directly reducing the energy required to produce a nal good
(such as computer-aided technologies and industrial process electronic control
devices), or, more generally, as intangible assets including knowledge, organiza-
tional structure, and process design skills (Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang, 2002).
As in conventional energy use models, physical capital is assumed to be a quasi-
xed factor moving slowly over time in response to input price changes, while
energy-saving capital smoothly responds to shocks (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson
1Portugal dealt blow over budget goal,Financial Times, October 4, 2011.
2Hidden debt raises Spain bond fears,Financial Times, May 16, 2011.
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and Hitt, 2002). By incorporating a multi-level tax structure, where the upper
level (state) authority collects corporate income tax revenues and lower-level
authorities (regions and localities) levy a business income tax and an excise
tax on business energy use respectively, the model predicts that the regional
business income tax negatively a¤ects both forms of capital as well as the use
of energy in the long run. However, energy and energy-saving capital turn out
to be Allen substitutes in the short run. As for the price of energy, the local
energy tax lowers the long run equilibrium levels of physical capital and energy
- a conventional result in energy use models (Atkeson and Kehoe, 1999) - while
its impact on energy-saving capital is ambiguous. In the short run, an higher
energy price raises energy-saving capitals productivity and reduces aggregate
energy use.
In order to identify the e¤ect of factor input taxes on their use empirically,
I exploit the regional business income tax rate increases that were mandated
by the state in the Italian regions with excessive public debt. The empirical
strategy relies on the abrupt change in central government policy towards re-
gions that accompanied the widespread government changes that occurred at
the 2005 regional elections, making the tax mandates exogenous with respect to
the evolution of economic conditions, and in particular with respect to shocks
to energy use that might hit the regions during the second half of the 2000s.
In addition, I control for the fact that provincial authorities directly tax energy
by setting an excise tax on all business electricity uses, with the sole exemp-
tion of massive energy-intensive establishments. The estimation results based
on panel data over a decade (2000-2010) reveal that while mandated business
income tax hikes had no e¤ect on regional gross domestic product, they had a
signicant detrimental impact on employment, and particularly on the use of
human resources in S&T (science and technology) occupations, the latter being
interpretable as a proxy for energy-saving capital. Moreover, it turns out that
regional business income tax increases stimulate province-level business energy
use, lending support to the hypothesis of short run substitution between energy
and energy-saving capital. On the other hand, provincial excise taxes on energy
are generally found to lessen business consumption of energy. Finally, the es-
timation of region-level and province-level equations augmented with spatially
weighted averages of neighboring regions and provinces business and energy
taxes respectively does not provide any evidence of major shifts of production
facilities or variable input use from high-tax to low-tax localities during the
period analyzed here.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 models factor input
taxation by decentralized authorities and its impact on factor input use. Section
3 illustrates the empirical model and the dataset, section 4 presents the results
of the econometric analysis, and section 5 tests for the presence of spatial spill-
overs. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Multi-level taxation and factor input use
2.1 Technology
Business activity is carried out in a nite number of localities (indexed by l)
that are grouped into regions (indexed by r). Lr  1 is the number of localities
in region r. Within each locality, production of a nal good x takes place at a
xed number of ex ante identical plant locationsMl. Locations in this economy
constitute a xed factor of production, and owners of locations earn positive
rents (Cooley, Hansen and Prescott, 1995). In particular, a plant consists of a
location, capital installed in it, and a xed requirement of labor and energy to
operate it. Let klr index the stock of physical capital that is directly employed
for productive uses at a plant in locality l in region r. Similarly to Atkeson and
Kehoe (1999), physical capital is assumed to require energy in xed propor-
tions to deliver capital services. However, instead of posing the existence of a
continuum of capital goods that embody an exogenously given energy intensity
(an intrinsic energy type), the energy e¢ ciency score of a production process
is determined here by the size of energy-saving capital that is installed along
with productive physical capital (Diaz, Puch and Guillo, 2004). Let h index
energy-saving capital having the sole role of improving the energy e¢ ciency of
a plant, such as computer-aided technologies and industrial process electronic
control devices.3 At time t, the energy requirement ("lrt) of the physical capital
installed in a plant depends on its energy e¢ ciency according to:
"lrt  
hlrt
klrt (1)
where hlrt is the energy requirement per unit of productive capital, and is
an inverse function of installed energy-saving capital (hlrt), while  > 0 is a
technology parameter. Any energy used in excess of hlrt klrt is wasted.
The aggregate production function in locality l is:
Xlrt =Mlxlrt =
8<: Ml

lk

lrt

0
if
"lrt  hlrt klrt and lrt  
otherwise
(2)
where  < 1, and  is the xed labor requirement, meaning that any labor
employed at a plant in excess of  has zero marginal product. l di¤ers across
localities because of time-invariant locality traits reecting, say, the quality of
institutions or the level of social capital. Aggregate production in locality l
exhibits constant returns to scale in physical capital, labor and locations.
2.2 Tax structure
In the multi-tiered structure of government of this economy, the state, the re-
gions and the localities set the following business-related taxes. First, realized
3While energy-saving capital can be interpreted as tangible IT equipment directly reduc-
ing the energy requirement, it might lend itself to a broad human capital interpretation as
discussed in section 4 below.
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prots paid as dividends to the location owners are taxed at the nationwide,
proportional corporate income tax rate t. A precise denition of the corporate
income tax base is given below. Regional governments set a net income-type
value added tax on business income, i.e., a tax on the returns to the two forms
of capital net of depreciation, wage payments, and realized prots, at an ad
valorem rate  rt. Finally, localities set an excise tax on energy at the rate lrt.
Energy is elastically supplied to each locality at price v.
Debt interest expenses and labor costs are entirely deductible from the cor-
porate income tax base, but neither is from the regional business income tax
base. Depreciation allowances can be deducted from the tax base at the homo-
geneous rate 0 for both taxes. Prots in locality ls establishments (plrt) can
consequently be expressed as:
plrt =

xlrt   (v + lrt)
klrt
hlrt
  clrt

(1  t    rt) (3)
  w(1  t)  (klrt + hlrt) [(+ )  t (+ 0)   rt0]
where  is the real interest rate, and w is the wage rate.4 clrt is an idiosyncratic
cost shock that is assumed to be deductible from corporate and value added
taxes. It is independently and identically distributed across time and across
locations, according to a uniform distribution on the [c; c+c] interval, with
c;c > 0. clrt can be interpreted as capturing the cost of intermediate goods,
materials, and services needed to produce x at a given plant. Productive and
energy-saving capital are assumed to be supplied elastically to each locality, and
to depreciate at the same rate  > 0.5
Consider rst a non-stochastic environment where clrt = c , a constant, and
the two forms of capital smoothly adjust in response to tax policy changes, with
energy use moving according to equation (1). Prot maximization at locality
ls plants leads to the following rst order conditions for k and h:8>>><>>>:
lk
 1
lrt    vlrt

hlrt
=
(1  t) + 
1  t    rt
h
1  0 t+rt(1 t)+
i
vlrt
klrt
h2lrt
=
(1  t) + 
1  t    rt
h
1  0 t+rt(1 t)+
i (4)
where vlrt = v+lrt is the after-tax energy price, and the right hand side of (4)
is the conventional user cost of capital.6
4 I abstract here from modelling the household sector, and assume that labor is elastically
supplied at the rate w in all localities. In order to focus on the e¤ect of tax policy changes,
all pre-tax input prices are taken to be time-invariant.
5The supply of capital goods might be upward sloping in the short run in the presence of
external costs of adjusting the capital stock (Goolsbee, 1998). However, the hypothesis that I
make here of a perfectly elastic supply curve for the two forms of capital is both conventional
and plausible in the context of small localities.
6By assuming constant prices for productive capital and energy-saving equipment, I can
abstract from consideration of capital gains/losses on undepreciated stocks. Moreover, rental
rates for physical capital and IT energy-saving equipment are assumed equal (Krusell et al.,
2000).
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According to the rst order condition for productive capital, the net return
to an additional unit of physical capital in production is made of its marginal
product minus the energy cost that such unit entails given the energy-saving
capital that is installed, i.e., the energy requirement per unit of capital


hlrt

times the energy price inclusive of the excise tax (vlrt). Such return is equalized
to the user cost of capital consisting of the compensation for lenders (), the
true economic depreciation rate (), the depreciation provision for tax purposes
(0), and state and regional tax rates (t;  rt). The rst order condition for
energy-saving capital equates the marginal energy saving in energy price terms
- i.e., the energy consumption that is foregone thanks to an additional unit of
h, and that is increasing in the stock of physical capital installed in the plant -
to the rental cost of capital.
Consider the factor input use response to tax policy changes. Following an
exogenous (mandated) increase in region rs business income tax rate  rt, the
user cost of capital increases. Given that both forms of capital exhibit decreasing
returns, productive and energy-saving capital are driven away from region rs
plant locations. The Appendix proves the following:
Proposition 1 If plant energy use is set to "lrt = hlrt klrt, then: (i)
dklrt
drt
< 0;
(ii) dhlrtdrt < 0; (iii)
d"lrt
drt
< 0.
The new equilibrium input mix has lower physical capital, lower energy-
saving capital and lower energy use in region rs localities as a result of the
business income tax increase. When all factors of production adjust, energy
and capital are complements, mimicking the conventional long-run result of
neoclassical energy use models (Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1983).
As far as the e¤ects of provincial energy tax policy are concerned, the Ap-
pendix proves the following:
Proposition 2 If plant energy use is set to "lrt = hlrt klrt, then: (i)
dklrt
dlrt
< 0;
(ii) dhlrtdlrt > 0 if
klrt
hlrt
> 1  ; (iii)
d"lrt
dlrt
< 0.
As the price of energy increases as a result of the increase in the provincial
excise tax, use of physical capital unambiguously decreases. On the other hand,
energy-saving capital might either increase or decrease as a result of the energy
tax shock. First,  raises the marginal product of energy-saving equipment,
pushing towards a more intense use of h. Second, h tends to diminish because
less physical capital is employed. The nal e¤ect on the use of h turns out to
depend on the energy intensity of production. At high energy intensity (high
klrt
hlrt
), the former e¤ect dominates, and the energy price increase stimulates
the use of energy-saving capital. The reverse occurs at low energy intensity.
Finally, plant-level energy use unambiguously falls in the long run as a result of
the energy tax hike.
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2.3 Quasi-xed factors and short run adjustment
Consider now the short run response of factor input use to scal perturbations.
In conventional energy use models, physical capital is taken to be a quasi-xed
factor moving slowly in response to input price changes, while energy is treated
as a exible input. In Pindyck and Rotemberg (1983) putty-putty model, the
presence of capital adjustment costs coupled with the high short run complemen-
tarity between energy and capital leads to little short run response of the former
to energy price shocks. In the long run, capital adjusts and so does energy, re-
producing a similar capital-energy ratio and generating a large cross-sectional
negative correlation between energy prices and capital. A considerable degree
of short run complementarity between energy and capital is found in putty-clay
models too (Atkeson and Kehoe, 1999), where a large variety of types of capital
goods are combined with energy in di¤erent xed proportions. The fact that
capital goods are designed with a xed energy intensity and that investment in
each type of capital must be nonnegative delivers a low elasticity of energy use
to energy price in the short run. In the long run, permanent increases in energy
prices alter the mix of capital goods towards less energy-intensive types, with en-
ergy use displaying a large own price elasticity. As for energy-saving capital, the
arguments spelled out and the evidence reported in Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and
Hitt (2002), Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002)
suggest that it ought to be treated as exible. Indeed, since IT capital tends
to be disproportionately associated with intangible assets relative to ordinary
physical capital, rms might sustain non-negligible adjustment costs in terms
of software development, business process innovation, and workplace organiza-
tional transformation before computer capital becomes fully e¤ective. However,
it is well documented by case examples and large-sample empirical evidence
that ITs are the easiest to vary of the assets in the cluster of complementary in-
novations (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2002), and this hypothesis seems
plausible in the context of narrowly focused energy-saving technologies.
I allow establishments to be hit by idiosyncratic cost shocks clrt having the
stochastic properties dened above. Within this environment, entrepreneurs
decisions on production across the available plant locations take place in two
stages: at the beginning of period t, they have to decide on physical capi-
tal installation in a locality. This occurs after observing the tax rate vector
z0lrt = [t  rt lrt], but before observing the idiosyncratic shocks hitting plants.
All other variables, including the size of energy-saving capital employed and the
binary choice of whether a plant will actually be operated, are set in the second
stage, after observing the realization of clrt. The second stage decision deter-
mines the capacity utilization rate across locality ls plants, with unprotable
plants remaining idle.
Consider the second stage plant operation decision rst: upon observing the
idiosyncratic shock clrt, and once k has been installed, plant l is operated if the
value of output exceeds variable input costs, i.e., if net operating income (ylrt)
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is positive:
ylrt  (1  t    rt)

lk

lrt   vlrt
klrt
hlrt
  clrt   rt   hlrturt

 0 (5)
where rt  w

1 t
1 t rt

is the tax-adjusted cost of labor, urt is the user cost
of capital in region r, and energy saving capital is set according to:
vlrt
klrt
h2lrt
= urt  (1  t) + 
1  t    rt

1  0 t +  rt
(1  t) + 

(6)
Let clrt be the cuto¤ cost shock at which plant l just breaks even:
clrt = lk

lrt   vlrt
klrt
hlrt
  rt   hlrturt (7)
Whenever a plant has an higher cost shock than clrt, it will remain idle:
xlrt =
8<: lk

lrt
0
if
clrt  clrt
clrt > c

lrt
(8)
Given that clrt is uniformly distributed between c and c +c, the fraction
of plants that are operated in locality l is:
Pr(clrt < c

lrt) =
clrtR
c
1
c
dclrt =
clrt   c
c
(9)
Turn now to the rst stage decision about installation of physical capital.
Expected prots at locality ls establishments are:
E [plrtj zlrt] (10)
= E [ylrtj zlrt]  klrt [(+ )  t (+ 0)   rt0]
=
clrtR
c
1
c
[ylrtj zlrt] dclrt   klrt [(+ )  t (+ 0)   rt0]
Using the fact that clrt = c Pr(clrt < c

lrt) + c from equation (9), the rst
order condition for physical capital installation is:
lk
 1
lrt    vlrt

hlrt

clrt   c
c

= urt (11)
Equation (11) has a straightforward interpretation: the marginal return of
physical capital weighted by the probability that the plant will be operated
equals the user cost of capital. With physical capital determined according to
(11), expected use of energy in locality l is:
E [Elrtj zlrt] =
clrtR
c
1
c
klrt
hlrt
Mldclrt (12)
=
klrt
hlrt
Ml Pr(clrt < c

lrt)
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Let us now see how expected energy use in locality l as dened in (12)
changes in response to tax policy changes, given the level of physical capital
determined in the rst stage. The Appendix proves the following:
Proposition 3 If physical capital is installed in plants according to equation
(11), and plants are operated according to equation (8), then: (i) dE[Elrtjzlrt]dlrt <
0; (ii) dE[Elrtjzlrt]drt > 0 if vlrt is lower than a cuto¤ energy price v

lrt.
An energy tax increase unambiguously lowers the use of energy in the short
run. First, an higher price of energy stimulates the use of energy-saving equip-
ment by raising its productivity (equation (6)), thereby curbing energy use.
Second, equations (7) and (9) show that the fraction of plants that are oper-
ated falls. On the other hand, a shock to  rt hikes the user cost of capital
and depresses the level of energy-saving capital (equation (6)), boosting energy
use; however, the plant operation rate diminishes, lowering expected energy use.
The former e¤ect dominates if energy prices are low, or net operating income is
high. It follows that, conditional on output, i.e., for given plant utilization rate
in a locality, energy-saving capital and energy are substitutes. In particular, the
short run cross-price Allen elasticity of energy with respect to the user cost of
capital (Atkeson and Kehoe, 1999) is:
dE[Elrtjzlrt]
durt
E[Elrtjzlrt]
urt

dK=0
dX=0
=
1
2
 lrt (13)
where  lrt  hlrturtvlrt"lrt denotes the plant-level cost of energy-saving equipment
relative to the cost of energy. If, as in Diaz, Puch and Guillo (2004), we set
energy expenditures at 4.6% of GDP and energy-saving capital costs at 4.3% of
GDP, we obtain a short run Allen elasticity of energy use with respect to the
user cost of capital of 0.467, an almost identical gure as the one estimated by
Pindyck and Rotemberg (1983: p. 1074, Table 2, panel A).
3 Empirical analysis: data
I analyze the impact of taxes on the use of factor inputs in Italian localities
(provinces and regions), and exploit the changes on rmsscal burdens pro-
voked by state-mandated business tax increases in a number of regions. As
mentioned above, the major subcentral tax formally falling onto business in
Italy is the regional business income tax (IRAP, Imposta Regionale sulle At-
tività Produttive). It is an origin based net income-type value added tax paid
by all rms, including self-employed activities (Bordignon, Giannini and Pan-
teghini, 2001; Bird, 2003; Keen, 2003). The tax base is calculated annually
by a direct subtraction method as the di¤erence between gross receipts (sales
revenues) and the cost of intermediate goods and services.7 Neither labor costs
7Specic rules apply to nancial intermediaries and insurance companies.
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nor debt interest payments are deductible, while conventional tax depreciation
provisions apply to outlays for capital goods. The tax is neutral with respect to
choice of organizational form, and to equity versus debt nancing.8 As for the
tax rate, strict limitations on regional rates have existed since its introduction:
until 2007, a baseline rate of 4.25% was set nationwide, and regions were allowed
to vary it by one percentage point. The central rate was then uniformly reduced
to 3.90% in 2008, leaving regions the possibility of increasing or decreasing it
by 0.92 percentage points.
The regional business tax was introduced in 1998 to fund health expendi-
tures, the largest outlay in the Italian regionsbudgets. Total regional health
expenditures surpassed e100 billion in 2006, or around 7% of national GDP and
over 80% of total regional spending, with an annual real growth rate system-
atically exceeding that of GDP in the past two decades. This brought Italys
share of GDP spent on health from signicantly below the OECD average in
the early 1990s to close to EU countriesaverage around the mid 2000s (Tediosi,
Gabriele and Longo, 2009).9 While the Italian regions have been in charge of
managing and delivering health care services for over thirty years, the issue of
the nancing of regional health expenditures is still amply debated. During the
late 1990s and early 2000s, the own revenue structure of the regions was deeply
reformed with the aim of raising the health care budget share to be funded by
own revenues and fostering regional government accountability (Bordignon and
Turati, 2009; Ferrario and Zanardi, 2011). Moreover, the state and the regions
agreed in principle on a system of rewards and sanctions to control excessive
increases in expenditures and prevent the creation of budget decits.
In spite of those e¤orts, the terms of the nancial relationships between
state and regional governments remained opaque enough during the early years
of the decade as to allow the soft budget constraint problem to explode in the
subsequent years. The mounting popular outrage fueled by news of malpractice,
fraud and corruption episodes in a number of regions led the newly elected
national government in 2006 to mandate increases in regional own tax rates
in order to have the burden of scal consolidation fall only onto those regions
taxpayers.10 The regional business income tax rate - an income-type value
added tax discussed in more detail below - increased by state command by one
percentage point (from the baseline rate of 4.25% to 5.25% of net value added)
in six nancially distressed regions (table 1). In spite of a nationwide reduction
8Moreover, the tax does not discriminate between di¤erent sources of equity capital (re-
tained earnings versus new subscriptions), and all prots are included in the tax base, irre-
spective of whether they are retained or distributed. No tax credit is given to shareholders
for the tax paid by the company (Bordignon, Giannini and Panteghini, 2001).
9 In the World Health Organization Report (2000), the Italian health service ranked 2nd
among 191 countries with respect to health status, fairness in nancial contribution, and
responsiveness to peoples needs. However, self-reported health conditions, satisfaction with
the health care system and popular perception of its quality consistently turned out to be
among the lowest in Europe in a number of surveys (Blendon, Kim and Benson, 2001; Maio
and Manzoli, 2002).
10Total regional debt amounted to over e16 billion in 2005, about half of it being attributable
to two regions (Lazio in Central Italy and Campania in Southern Italy).
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of the regional business income baseline rate to 3.90% as part of a scal stimulus
package launched in 2008, mandated rate increases followed in the subsequent
years for further regions exhibiting growing decits.11 Moreover, the worsening
budgetary prospects in four regions induced the state to mandate additional
increases in the regional business income tax rate of 0.15% in 2009 and 2010.
Overall, as reported in table 1, almost half of the 20 Italian regions were a¤ected
by various state-mandated tax increases. The tax hikes led to an average scal
burden di¤erential for business located in health decit-running areas of over 14
relative to balanced budget regions.
The empirical strategy of using the regional tax changes provoked by state
mandates to estimate the impact of taxes on input use in local production
processes relies on the abrupt change in central government policy towards re-
gions that accompanied the widespread government changes that occurred at the
2005 regional elections. This makes the tax mandates exogenous with respect to
the evolution of economic conditions across the regions, and in particular with
respect to shocks to energy use that might hit the regions during the second
half of the 2000s. However, in order to capture the potential e¤ects of other
time-varying omitted variables that could be correlated both with the tax man-
date decisions and with the province-level variables of interest thus biasing our
main results, I control for GDP at the regional level and for the evolution of the
demographic size and structure in the energy use determination equation.
In addition to the regional business tax, an excise consumption tax is applied
by the lower-level of government - the provinces - on business uses of electricity.
The provincial level of government is made of 103 jurisdictions, whose average
size roughly corresponds to that of French Départements, US counties and UK
counties.12 The provincial tax falls onto all enterprises employing electricity,
with the sole exception of massive energy-intensive establishments exceeding
kWh 200,000 consumption per month (around fty times the typical monthly
electricity requirement of a small rm). Provincial authorities can set a rate
between a statewide lower limit of e9.30 and an upper limit of e11.40 per 1,000
kWh. The limits have remained unchanged in nominal terms through the past
decade. Electricity tax revenues make above 13 of provincial own revenues, the
rest of provincial expenditures - mostly in the areas of environmental protection
and road maintenance - being funded by motor vehicle registration taxes and
state grants (Di Porto and Revelli, 2013; Revelli, 2013).
In terms of overall price of electricity, the relatively modest involvement of
Italy in European power markets, partly due to limited interconnection capac-
ity, precluded economic e¢ ciency gains and allowed a considerable degree of
market concentration during the 2000s (Creti, Fumagalli and Fumagalli, 2010).
11One region (Liguria) was allowed to come back to the baseline rate in 2008 thanks to
disciplined spending behavior and credible attempts to cut decit.
12Holmes (1998) uses US county manufacturing employment data to test the e¤ect of state
policies on the location of business. Devereux, Gri¢ th and Simpson (2007) use plant-level data
to study rmslocation choices at the level of the UK counties. As argued by Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales (2004) in their analysis of the economic impact of local nancial development
within an integrated nancial market in Italy: From an economic point of view the natural
unit of analysis is the province.
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This makes electricity prices in Italy generally higher than EU average for both
domestic and business uses, and amongst the highest in Europe as far as small
to medium enterprise uses are concerned (European Commission, 2014), with
taxes contributing to over one third of the nal price of energy (Eurostat, 2014).
I test the e¤ects of the regional business tax and the provincial electricity
tax on electricity consumption at the provincial level, that is available by sector
of economic activity on an yearly basis for the entire decade 2000   2010.13
Energy consumption data come from the holder of the national electricity grid
(TERNA, Rete Elettrica Nazionale). Since I do not have micro-level data on
energy use by plants, I investigate the e¤ect of the energy tax both on total
business energy consumption in a province, and on business use in the service
sector, where average rm size is small and energy consumption is moderate. I
also test the e¤ect of the tax on domestic energy consumption, which should be
nil given that domestic consumption is exempt from the tax.
I next verify the impact of those taxes on a number of variables measured
at the regional level and available from ISTAT, National Statistics Institute,
including GDP and employment by sector of economic activity for the period
2000   2009, and I exploit information from EUROSTAT Statistics on human
resources in S&T (science and technology) occupations. Moving to the regional
level substantially reduces the number of observations (from over 1,000 to less
than 200), but allows me to examine a richer set of indicators of real economic
activity. In particular, given the lack of territorial capital stock data, the size
of human resources in S&T occupations - and particularly highly skilled human
resources that have successfully completed education at the third level in an
S&T eld of study - can be interpreted as a proxy for energy-saving capital in
terms of their contribution to the optimal design and management of production
processes. Finally, I use provincesand regionsresident population size and age
structure as controls. Summary statistics are reported in table 2.
4 Estimation results
Tables 3 and 4 report the estimation results on the panel of provinces of the
energy use equation:
ln(Elrt) = 1 ln( rt) + 2 ln(lrt) + ln(zlrt)
0
 + ilr + yt + elrt (14)
where I control for nationwide inuences on economic activity (such as state
corporate tax policy, pre-tax energy price movements, and the business cycle)
by including the year dummies yt. Unobserved time-invariant provincial traits
(ilr) are controlled for by demeaning equation (14). The results in table 3 only
include the provincial energy excise (lrt) and regional business tax rate ( rt) as
13Three regions (two small bilingual regions in the Alps, and the island of Sardinia) and
the corresponding seven provinces are excluded from the analysis beacuse of their peculiar
institutional status and of substantial changes in their structure of local government during
the decade considered here. Further, three provinces involved by boundary changes due to the
creation of new local authorities are excluded too. This leaves us with data on 93 provinces.
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explanatory variables, while the specications in table 4 control for an additional
set of variables z (resident population size, share of elderly population, and GDP
measured at the regional level).14 Reported standard errors in tables 3 and 4
are clustered by region.15
The results reveal virtually no impact of the two taxes on total or domestic
electricity consumption: the latter turns out to be largely driven by the size of
resident population (column (4.2)), with an elasticity of 0:6. On the other hand,
the regional business income tax rate has a positive and signicant e¤ect (an
elasticity of about 0:2) on total business electricity consumption, in particular
on the part of it that is used in the service sector (columns (3.5) and (4.5)).
The e¤ect on total business electricity is less precisely estimated, though, when
GDP is controlled for in table 4: total business electricity consumption increases
with GDP with an elasticity of 0:7, and decreases with the share of elderly
population with an elasticity of  0:7. Expectedly, the energy tax turns out to
have a signicant negative e¤ect in the service sector only, where most small
and medium-sized rms that are liable to the payment of the tax are found. The
result is robust to the inclusion of population size and composition and GDP as
controls. The elasticity of electricity consumption in the service sector to the
electricity tax is estimated to be around  0:1.
As a robustness check of the above ndings, tables 5 and 6 report the estima-
tion results of specications where the growth rates of energy use in the various
sectors are employed as dependent variables, and are regressed on growth rates
of the explanatory variables. Table 6 in particular adds one year lags of the
energy use determinants. The overall picture is similar to the one emerging
from tables 3 and 4, though the energy tax e¤ect vanishes. However, tables
5 and 6 show that GDP and demographic growth turn out to be important
determinants of total and business electricity consumption growth, and, most
importantly, that the impact of the regional business income tax on energy use
in the service sector remains positive and signicant.
One might worry at this point that the positive e¤ect of the business income
tax on energy use be due to factors other than the mandated tax increases,
particularly if the path of energy use consumption in the regions a¤ected by
the tax mandates (most of them located in Southern Italy) were signicantly
di¤erent than the path of energy use in una¤ected, control regions of Northern
Italy. This would create a spurious correlation between the energy use trajectory
and the regional tax rates. I have therefore tested the di¤erence in pre-treatment
trends (before tax mandates were enacted in 2006) by estimating an energy use
equation that allows for a di¤erential trend in treatedregions (the regions listed
in table 1) versus control regions in the 2000 to 2006 time period. The treated
region dummy interacted with the linear time trend variable is never estimated
to be signicantly di¤erent from zero, and the parallel trends hypothesis cannot
therefore be rejected. Total and business energy use at the regional level show
14The number of observations falls from 1020 in table 3 to 930 in table 4 because GDP is
observed until year 2009 only.
15Standard errors are virtually identical when employing cluster bootstrapping (Cameron,
Gelbach and Miller, 2008).
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an annual growth rate of about 2 per cent, the di¤erence between treated and
control region over 2000 to 2006 equaling 0.08% (p-value=0.68) and 0.19% (p-
value=0.42) for total and business energy use respectively. For energy use in the
service sector, the average annual growth rate is almost 6 per cent, the di¤erence
between treated and control regions being again positive (0.1%) but far from
signicant (p-value=0.71).
Table 7 reports instead the results of estimating a dynamic specication,
where a lagged dependent variable is included along with lags of the explana-
tory variables. I estimate the dynamic panel data model by the conventional
Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM (generalized method of moments) that trans-
forms the model in rst di¤erences to get rid of the province-specic e¤ects ilr,
and uses lags of the dependent variable dated t   2 and earlier as instruments
for the lagged dependent variable. I use up to the t   5 lag to build the ma-
trix of instruments. The rst and second order serial autocorrelation tests on
the rst-di¤erenced equation residuals point to the presence of rst-order, but
not of second-order serial correlation, suggesting that twice lagged values of the
dependent variable are valid instruments in the rst-di¤erenced equation, while
in two of the four equations the Sargan test marginally rejects the hypothesis
of instrument orthogonality. Again, the results are generally compatible with
the evidence presented above, with GDP playing an important role in explain-
ing energy consumption patterns. The elasticity of energy use with respect to
GDP is estimated to be around 0:3, a result that is remarkably robust across
the di¤erent specications, and is in line with the recent cross-country empir-
ical evidence (Ozturk, 2010; Belke, Dobnik and Dreger, 2011). As for scal
policies, the e¤ect of the provincial electricity tax dwindles, while that of the
regional business income tax remains fairly strong in the service sector energy
use equation.
The above specications might su¤er from an endogeneity problem if provin-
cial authorities anticipate changes in electricity consumption, and manoeuvre
their tax rates accordingly. For instance, if they expect energy consumption to
decline due, say, to widespread investment in energy-saving technologies or ris-
ing energy prices, they might be somewhat mechanically forced to increase the
electricity excise tax in order to prevent a tax revenue decline. Table 8 presents
GMM estimates of a dynamic panel data specication that allows provincial
electricity tax rates to be determined endogenously, adding electricity tax rates
lagged t  2 to t  5 to the instrument matrix. The rst and second order serial
autocorrelation tests as well as the Sargan test now pass in all equations at
conventional condence levels. However, while the e¤ect of the electricity tax
on electricity consumption turns out now to be negative and large in the service
sector (but not in the other sectors), it is still imprecisely estimated.
Table 9 reports the xed e¤ects estimation results on region-level macro-
economic data (GDP and employment). Neither tax is estimated to have a
signicant impact on GDP (column (9.1)). GDP is estimated to grow with
population with an elasticity of about 0:3. In column (9.2), employment in the
service sector does indeed rise with GDP and declines when the cost of labor
increases due to the mandated tax hike, while the e¤ect of the average provin-
14
cial energy tax is not signicant. Columns (9.3) and (9.4) turn to the type
of occupation of human resources. In particular, column (9.3) uses the (log of
the) stock of human resources in S&T occupation, independently of workers
education level. Column (9.4) focuses instead on highly skilled human resources
(those that have successfully completed education at the third level in an S&T
eld of study) that are employed in an S&T occupation. This mainly includes
professionals and technicians with tertiary education, such as IT system de-
signers, computer programmers, biologists, engineers and economists. In a way,
espousing the view of energy-saving capital as a manifestation of human capital
in the form of technical skills needed to optimally design and manage a produc-
tion process, human resources in S&T occupation might be interpretable as a
proxy for the stock of energy-saving capital in the regional economy.
The results in table 9 are generally compatible with the theoretical model:
the regional business tax is estimated to strongly and signicantly depress both
indicators of human capital, with the elasticity being slightly larger (over 0:3 in
absolute value) for highly skilled workers. On the other hand, average energy
taxes in the region turn out to have no e¤ect on human resources in S&T,
plausibly due both to the fact that I cannot distinguish here between human
resources that are employed by large, energy-intensive rms that are exempt
from the provincial electricity tax and those in small and medium enterprises,
and to the minor role that is generally played by energy taxation relative to
value added taxation in most business sectors.
As a nal check on the results obtained on the determinants of electricity
use at the provincial level, I estimate equation (14) on the panel of regions.
The results are reported in table 10. I use the same electricity aggregates as
in tables 3 to 8 and control in addition here for the number of rms. While
being potentially endogenous, the number of rms is arguably a non-negligible
determinant of the use of energy. In the last column, I restrict the analysis to the
eight regions that actually had an increase in the regional business tax. While
reducing quite substantially the tax rate variation that can be exploited, any
evidence emerging from this restricted sample would strengthen the conclusion
that the scal impact on energy use is not due in reality to systematic di¤erences
between the regions that were a¤ected by the tax mandates and those that were
not. Reassuringly, all previous results are conrmed in this region-level analysis,
including the one on the restricted sample in column (10.6), with the regional
business tax having a positive impact and the average provincial energy tax
having a negative impact on energy use in the service sector.
5 Spatial spill-overs
Spatial di¤erences in factor input prices could in principle foster mobility of
business activity across provinces, and make economic outcomes and tax bases
in a jurisdiction depend on tax policies implemented in other jurisdictions
(Brueckner, 2003). Ignoring cross-locality scal spillovers when they are ac-
tually important might yield biased estimates if decentralized tax policy follows
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a spatial auto-correlation pattern. If economic activity in province l (Xlt) is
a¤ected by tax policy in a nearby province j (jt) due to tax base mobility,
and cov(lt; jt) 6= 0, omission of jt from the empirical model will cause the
estimate of the impact of lt on Xlt to su¤er from a standard omitted variable
bias.
In fact, as shown in table 11, the Moran test for spatial dependence reveals
some evidence of positive spatial auto-correlation among adjacent provinces
policies in the mid-sample years, while the null hypothesis of random assignment
of energy tax rates in space cannot be rejected either in the early sample years,
or towards the end of the decade, when most provincial authorities were against
the statewide upper tax rate bound.16 In order to test the relevance of scal
spillovers, I allow tax policies in neighboring provinces to have an e¤ect on
energy use in a province by including a spatially weighted average of electricity
tax rates in the other L  1 provinces in equation (14):
ln(Elrt) = 1 ln( rt)+ 2 ln(lrt)+ 3 ln(elrt)+ ln(zlrt)0 + ilr + yt+ elrt (15)
where: elrt = LP
j=1
!ljjst (16)
In equation (16), f!ljg  0 - with !lj = 0 if l = j - is a set of non-stochastic
weights based on provincesgeographic location, and might equal (or be close
to) zero for a non-negligible number of (l; j) pairs (Anselin, 1988).
Similarly, for each region r = 1; :::; R and each year, I build a spatially
weighted average of business income tax rates in the other R  1 regions:
e rt = RP
s=1
!rs st (17)
where the !rs weights play a similar role as !lj . In fact, !lj = !rs for l 2 r
and j 2 s would imply that all provinces located in a region are exposed to
spill-overs of the same intensity from tax policies in nearby regions, irrespective
of their own within-region location.
Based on (16) and (17), I experimented with a number of spatial patterns
that di¤er by range and complexity. I report three sets of results in tables 12 to
14 based on fairly standard spatial modelling choices (McMillen, 2010). Table 12
reports the results of a region-level specication that relies on a border-sharing
criterion, meaning that !rs = 1nr if regions r and s share a border, with nr
standing for the number of adjacent regions to region r, and !rs = 0 otherwise.
The resulting spatial term in equation (17) is the average business income tax
rate in the regions bordering region r.17 Tables 13 and 14 report the estimation
16The Moran statistic equals ( eX0 eX) 1 eX0W eX, with eX as the demeaned vector of the vari-
able of interest, and W a square matrix weighting observation pairs (typically in a binary
way) based on their vicinity (Anselin, 1988). In fact, the Moran statistic is the OLS estimate
from a regression of a rst-order spatial lag of X on X.
17Each region has one to four neighbors. The island of Sicily is assumed to have as sole
neighbor the region of Calabria, at the extreme south-west of the peninsula.
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results of province-level spatial specications for the use of energy. In table
13, I use a border-sharing criterion, where energy use in a province is allowed
to be a¤ected by the average energy tax in adjacent provinces, irrespective of
whether those provinces belong to the same or di¤erent regions. In table 14, I
use instead the average business taxes and average provincial energy taxes in
the set of regions bordering the region where a province is located.
The results show no evidence of signicant scal spillovers in either of those
spatial models, suggesting that tax policy changes did not bring about any ma-
jor shift of production facilities or input use from high-tax to low-tax localities,
with factor input adjustments mostly taking place within localities. In fact, due
to plant relocation costs, shifting real production across localities in response to
tax di¤erentials only tends to be a feasible option for multiplant rms operating
establishments in di¤erent sites (Markusen, 1995), with smaller-sized local busi-
ness responding to scal shocks in the short run chiey by manoeuvring their
exible factor input mix.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has studied theoretically and investigated empirically the e¤ects of
state-mandated selective local tax increases on the economy, focusing in partic-
ular on the impact of factor input taxes on their use in a decentralized economy.
Based on a model of input choice within a multi-jurisdiction neoclassical frame-
work, where production takes place in plants and physical capital requires energy
in xed proportions depending on the size of energy-saving capital that is in-
stalled, I have made use of the business tax rate increases that were mandated
by the state in the Italian regions with excessive budget decits around the mid
2000s.
The panel data estimation results shed light on a number of aspects of the
interaction between policy choices and local production processes. First, they
reveal that mandated regional tax hikes had a signicant detrimental impact
on employment at the regional level, and particularly on human resources in
S&T occupations. An interpretation that is compatible with the theoretical
model is that those human resources can be viewed as a proxy for energy-
saving capital. Second, those mandated tax increases had a positive impact
on province-level business energy use, lending support to the theoretical hy-
pothesis of short run substitution between energy and energy-saving capital.
On the other hand, provincial excise taxes on energy are generally found to
lessen business consumption of electricity, though the e¤ect is generally small
and not always statistically signicant, probably due to the minor role played
by energy taxation relative to value added taxation in most business sectors.
Finally, the estimation of region-level and province-level equations augmented
with spatially weighted averages of neighboring regions and provincesbusiness
and energy taxes respectively does not provide any evidence of major shifts of
production facilities or variable input use from high-tax to low-tax provinces
during the period analyzed here.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
Totally di¤erentiate the rst order conditions (4), divide by d rt, and rearrange:
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Solving system (18) by Cramers rule:
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The determinant D in the denominator is positive due to concavity of the
prot function (3). This proves parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition. Using (1),
(19), and (20), and the fact that lk
 1
lrt  (v + lrt) h 1lrt = (v + lrt) klrth 2lrt
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from the rst order conditions (4), the e¤ect of  rt on the use of energy is:
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Proof of proposition 2
Totally di¤erentiate the rst order conditions (4), divide by dlrt, and rearrange:
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where I have used lk
 1
lrt  = (v + lrt) h
 1
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lrt ) from (4). Finally,
the e¤ect of the excise tax on the use of energy is:
d"lrt
dlrt
=

hlrt

dklrt
dlrt

   klrt
h2lrt

dhlrt
dlrt

(25)
=
2
h3lrtD
(   1)lklrt < 0
Proof of proposition 3
Derive equation (12) with respect to lrt:
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Using (6), and totally di¤erentiating it to obtain dhlrtdlrt :
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Next derive equation (12) with respect to  rt. Using (6), and with t =
(1  t) + (   0):
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Table 1
Mandated ( ) regional business income tax rates (%)
region 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Abruzzo 4.25 5.25 4.82 4.82 4.82
Calabria 4.25 4.25 3.90 4.82 4.97
Campania 4.55 5.25 4.82 4.97 4.97
Lazio 4.25 5.25 4.82 4.82 4.97
Liguria 4.25 5.25 3.90 3.90 3.90
Molise 4.25 5.25 4.82 4.82 4.97
Puglia 4.25 4.25 4.82 4.82 4.82
Sicilia 4.25 5.25 4.82 4.82 4.82
baseline rate 4.25 4.25 3.90 3.90 3.90
Notes: the remaining 12 regions su¤ered no state-mandated rate increase. The Liguria
region was freed from the mandated rate increase after 2007.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics
provinces (1,020 observations)
mean s.d. min max source
electricity use (GWh=1,000 MWh) TERNA Rete Elettrica
- total 2,904.8 3,035.3 323.8 21,976.8
- domestic 646.4 774.8 75.9 5,687.4
- business 2,258.4 2,377.8 171.5 16,959.5
- services 583.7 928.7 38.2 7848.5
electricity rate (e/MWh) 10.5 0.9 9.3 11.4 Italian Government
population (,000) 583.1 645.2 88.7 4194.0 ISTAT
elderly population (%) 20.7 2.9 12.3 27.9 ISTAT
regions (170 observations)
GDP (e billion) 69.3 61.2 0.5 268.6 ISTAT
population (,000) 3,282.1 2,350.3 320.0 9,826.1 ISTAT
elderly population (%) 20.7 2.6 15.8 26.7 ISTAT
tertiary employment (,000) 810.4 618.5 63.6 2728.8 EUROSTAT
human resources in S&T 370.3 311.1 27.1 1491.0 EUROSTAT
skilled human res. in S&T 143.2 115.8 10.0 566.1 EUROSTAT
business income tax rate 4.33 0.3 3.9 5.25 Italian Government
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Table 3
Province-level electricity use
Electricity use
total domestic business non-service services
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5)
 rt
(regional business tax)
0.116
(0.071)
-0.007
(0.043)
0.182
(0.085)
0.122
(0.094)
0.178
(0.069)
lrt
(provincial energy tax)
0.015
(0.055)
0.010
(0.024)
0.008
(0.067)
-0.003
(0.089)
-0.113
(0.051)
obs. 1020 1020 1020 1020 1020
Notes: all variables in logs; year e¤ects and locality xed e¤ects included; standard errors
clustered by region in brackets below the coe¢ cients; ; ;: p-value < 0.01, 0.05, 0.10.
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Table 4
Province-level electricity use (constant output)
Electricity use
total domestic business non-service services
(4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5)
 rt
(regional business tax)
0.153
(0.084)
0.042
(0.041)
0.200
(0.106)
0.157
(0.119)
0.185
(0.066)
lrt
(provincial energy tax)
0.021
(0.053)
0.031
(0.019)
0.007
(0.069)
-0.003
(0.088)
-0.106
(0.045)
population
0.475
(0.425)
0.601
(0.185)
0.348
(0.540)
0.441
(0.590)
-0.219
(0.359)
elderly share
-0.518
(0.322)
0.171
(0.071)
-0.657
(0.247)
-0.830
(0.304)
-0.159
(0.250)
GDP
0.511
(0.325)
0.045
(0.130)
0.689
(0.403)
0.886
(0.454)
-0.322
(0.218)
obs. 930 930 930 930 930
Notes: see table 3.
27
Table 5
Province-level electricity use growth
Electricity use
total domestic business non-service services
(5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5)
 rt
0.021
(0.031)
-0.024
(0.024)
0.031
(0.037)
-0.006
(0.049)
0.059
(0.024)
lrt
0.006
(0.024)
0.034
(0.019)
-0.006
(0.034)
-0.011
(0.045)
-0.001
(0.019)
population
0.181
(0.314)
0.256
(0.289)
0.082
(0.445)
0.120
(0.479)
-0.102
(0.229)
elderly share
-0.517
(0.140)
0.211
(0.135)
-0.666
(0.202)
-0.854
(0.266)
-0.108
(0.196)
GDP
0.306
(0.111)
-0.071
(0.058)
0.377
(0.144)
0.564
(0.210)
-0.193
(0.137)
obs. 837 837 837 837 837
Notes: all variables in log(di¤erence); one cross-section is lost in building growth rates;
year e¤ects included; standard errors clustered by region in brackets below the coe¢ cients;
; ;: p-value < 0.01, 0.05, 0.10.
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Table 6
Province-level electricity use growth (lagged controls)
Electricity use
total domestic business non-service services
(6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5)
 rt
0.032
(0.031)
-0.021
(0.026)
0.047
(0.037)
0.009
(0.050)
0.073
(0.025)
 rt 1
-0.008
(0.037)
-0.007
(0.025)
-0.005
(0.049)
-0.010
(0.056)
0.040
(0.041)
lrt
-0.006
(0.031)
0.042
(0.023)
-0.028
(0.043)
-0.046
(0.058)
0.014
(0.029)
lrt 1
-0.015
(0.029)
-0.013
(0.023)
-0.017
(0.039)
-0.032
(0.047)
-0.008
(0.027)
population
0.115
(0.295)
0.065
(0.407)
0.081
(0.400)
0.093
(0.520)
-0.108
(0.319)
populationt 1
0.137
(0.304)
0.213
(0.244)
0.096
(0.350)
0.170
(0.495)
0.012
(0.192)
elderly share
-0.412
(0.292)
0.481
(0.276)
-0.719
(0.371)
-1.040
(0.471)
0.035
(0.327)
elderly sharet 1
-0.184
(0.332)
-0.268
(0.261)
-0.019
(0.413)
0.173
(0.519)
-0.217
(0.375)
GDP
0.330
(0.136)
-0.024
(0.079)
0.363
(0.166)
0.568
(0.245)
-0.210
(0.145)
GDPt 1
0.235
(0.136)
0.145
(0.076)
0.315
(0.167)
0.312
(0.169)
0.190
(0.210)
Long-term coe¢ cients

0.024
(0.052)
-0.028
(0.041)
0.042
(0.066)
-0.001
(0.077)
0.113
(0.047)

-0.021
(0.047)
0.029
(0.018)
-0.045
(0.061)
-0.078
(0.078)
0.006
(0.034)
obs. 744 744 744 744 744
Notes: see table 5.
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Table 7
Dynamic province-level electricity use
Electricity use
total domestic business non-service services
(7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5)
Elrt 1 0.750

(0.179)
0.026
(0.061)
0.836
(0.127)
0.802
(0.144)
0.458
(0.115)
 rt
0.018
(0.033)
-0.034
(0.030)
0.016
(0.044)
-0.011
(0.054)
0.073
(0.028)
 rt 1
-0.015
(0.042)
-0.017
(0.019)
-0.025
(0.048)
-0.004
(0.059)
-0.007
(0.037)
lrt
0.001
(0.032)
0.040
(0.021)
-0.020
(0.044)
-0.050
(0.052)
0.017
(0.030)
lrt 1
-0.016
(0.028)
-0.014
(0.021)
-0.014
(0.038)
-0.022
(0.047)
-0.022
(0.036)
population
0.008
(0.303)
-0.001
(0.299)
0.251
(0.451)
0.045
(0.622)
-0.080
(0.364)
populationt 1
0.129
(0.341)
0.281
(0.202)
-0.104
(0.460)
0.116
(0.654)
-0.164
(0.340)
elderly share
0.050
(0.309)
0.477
(0.259)
-0.262
(0.412)
-0.529
(0.538)
-0.248
(0.410)
elderly sharet 1
-0.249
(0.375)
-0.329
(0.232)
-0.001
(0.482)
0.269
(0.590)
-0.144
(0.361)
GDP
0.313
(0.130)
-0.048
(0.083)
0.321
(0.175)
0.562
(0.231)
-0.211
(0.146)
GDPt 1
0.118
(0.148)
0.230
(0.123)
0.060
(0.203)
-0.085
(0.243)
0.308
(0.205)
Long-term coe¢ cients

0.013
(0.189)
-0.052
(0.045)
-0.057
(0.315)
-0.073
(0.308)
0.122
(0.078)

-0.063
(0.143)
0.028
(0.018)
-0.209
(0.300)
-0.363
(0.365)
-0.010
(0.067)
AR(1) test (p value) -3.27 (0.00) -1.60 (0.10) -4.27 (0.00) -3.97 (0.00) -4.21 (0.00)
AR(2) test (p value) -0.38 (0.70) 0.10 (0.92) -0.11 (0.92) -0.21 (0.83) -0.80 (0.43)
Sargan test (p value) 37.12 (0.14) 50.44 (0.01) 30.57 (0.39) 28.08 (0.51) 46.39 (0.02)
obs. 744 744 744 744 744
Notes: Arellano and Bond (1991) generalized method of moments estimator; rst step
results; robust standard errors in brackets; instruments used until lag t-5; AR(1) and AR(2)
are tests for rst and second order serial correlation respectively, and are distributed as stan-
dard normal; the Sargan test is distributed as 2 with 29 degrees of freedom (number of
overidentifying restrictions); ; ;: p-value < 0.01, 0.05, 0.10.
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Table 8
Dynamic province-level electricity use (endogenous electricity tax)
Electricity use
total domestic business non-service services
(8.1) (8.2) (8.3) (8.4) (8.5)
Elrt 1 0.717

(0.143)
0.028
(0.067)
0.811
(0.104)
0.802
(0.120)
0.356
(0.109)
 rt
0.018
(0.030)
-0.035
(0.031)
0.021
(0.039)
-0.012
(0.048)
0.078
(0.032)
 rt 1
-0.006
(0.042)
-0.016
(0.020)
-0.013
(0.049)
0.007
(0.060)
0.009
(0.037)
lrt
0.016
(0.084)
-0.034
(0.070)
0.030
(0.115)
0.001
(0.147)
-0.250
(0.156)
lrt 1
0.038
(0.086)
0.016
(0.054)
0.057
(0.105)
0.067
(0.121)
0.111
(0.144)
population
-0.026
(0.268)
-0.014
(0.294)
0.190
(0.434)
-0.025
(0.604)
-0.371
(0.378)
populationt 1
0.208
(0.303)
0.271
(0.206)
0.024
(0.429)
0.272
(0.613)
-0.011
(0.361)
elderly share
0.013
(0.308)
0.471
(0.259)
-0.289
(0.412)
-0.498
(0.542)
-0.285
(0.425)
elderly sharet 1
-0.232
(0.378)
-0.324
(0.239)
0.015
(0.481)
0.241
(0.584)
-0.090
(0.355)
GDP
0.342
(0.132)
-0.061
(0.091)
0.351
(0.179)
0.594
(0.236)
-0.228
(0.159)
GDPt 1
0.143
(0.139)
0.212
(0.126)
0.111
(0.189)
-0.063
(0.217)
0.321
(0.221)
Long-term coe¢ cients

0.041
(0.171)
-0.053
(0.048)
0.042
(0.271)
-0.025
(0.285)
0.136
(0.067)

0.189
(0.191)
-0.018
(0.052)
0.459
(0.413)
0.342
(0.494)
-0.216
(0.127)
AR(1) test (p value) -3.65 (0.00) -1.68 (0.09) -4.58 (0.00) -4.36 (0.00) -3.35 (0.00)
AR(2) test (p value) -0.41 (0.68) 0.21 (0.83) -0.18 (0.86) -0.29 (0.77) -1.38 (0.17)
Sargan test (p value) 64.77 (0.11) 69.26 (0.06) 57.34 (0.28) 55.41 (0.35) 54.14 (0.39)
obs. 744 744 744 744 744
Notes: Arellano and Bond (1991) generalized method of moments estimator; rst step
results; robust standard errors in brackets; instruments used until lag t-5; AR(1) and AR(2)
are tests for rst and second order serial correlation respectively, and are distributed as stan-
dard normal; the Sargan test is distributed as 2 with 52 degrees of freedom (number of
overidentifying restrictions); ; ;: p-value < 0.01, 0.05, 0.10.
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Table 9
Region-level economic indicators
GDP tertiary human resources in S&T
employment total highly skilled
(9.1) (9.2) (9.3) (9.4)
 rt
0.021
(0.020)
-0.104
(0.037)
-0.276
(0.077)
-0.316
(0.117)
lrt
-0.020
(0.040)
0.002
(0.072)
0.163
(0.149)
0.011
(0.228)
population
0.317
(0.087)
0.103
(0.165)
0.673
(0.341)
-0.310
(0.521)
elderly share
-0.143
(0.095)
-0.158
(0.174)
-0.503
(0.359)
-1.216
(0.549)
GDP
0.349
(0.153)
0.212
(0.316)
-0.059
(0.483)
obs. 170 170 170 170
Notes: all variables in logs; year e¤ects and region xed e¤ects included; ; ;: p-value
< 0.01, 0.05, 0.10.
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Table 10
Region-level electricity use
Electricity use
total domestic business non-service services services
(10.1) (10.2) (10.3) (10.4) (10.5) (10.6)
 rt
0.067
(0.040)
0.003
(0.027)
0.090
(0.051)
0.009
(0.055)
0.100
(0.047)
0.228
(0.087)
lrt
-0.011
(0.078)
-0.056
(0.052)
-0.026
(0.099)
0.004
(0.106)
-0.378
(0.091)
-0.754
(0.152)
population
-0.228
(0.199)
0.371
(0.133)
-0.371
(0.253)
-0.427
(0.273)
-0.409
(0.235)
-0.872
(0.442)
elderly
0.301
(0.195)
0.305
(0.130)
0.385
(0.248)
0.424
(0.268)
0.071
(0.230)
0.696
(0.378)
GDP
0.417
(0.166)
0.037
(0.110)
0.477
(0.211)
0.617
(0.227)
-0.457
(0.196)
-0.222
(0.278)
rms
0.071
(0.074)
0.113
(0.050)
0.072
(0.094)
0.076
(0.101)
0.237
(0.087)
0.122
(0.166)
obs. 170 170 170 170 170 80
Notes: all variables in logs; year e¤ects (2000 to 2009) and region xed e¤ects included;
column (10.6) includes only the 8 regions having a business tax increase over the decade;
; ;: p-value < 0.01, 0.05, 0.10.
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Table 11
Moran test on provincial electricity tax rates
Moran test (p value)
2000 0.03 (0.54)
2001 0.06 (0.31)
2002 0.09 (0.14)
2003 0.12 (0.07)
2004 0.10 (0.15)
2005 0.17 (0.02)
2006 0.18 (0.01)
2007 0.13 (0.05)
2008 0.05 (0.38)
2009 0.05 (0.38)
Notes: 93 provincial electricity tax rates in each cross-section; the Moran statistic is
asymptotically normally distributed.
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Table 12
Spatial spill-overs: regions (border sharing)
GDP tertiary human resources in S&T
employment total highly skilled
(12.1) (12.2) (12.3) (12.4)
 rt
0.021
(0.022)
-0.126
(0.040)
-0.236
(0.083)
-0.335
(0.127)
lrt
-0.020
(0.041)
0.022
(0.073)
0.126
(0.152)
0.028
(0.233)e rt 0.001(0.035) 0.089(0.063) -0.166(0.130) 0.080(0.200)
population
0.318
(0.092)
0.176
(0.172)
0.538
(0.356)
-0.244
(0.548)
elderly share
-0.143
(0.097)
-0.118
(0.175)
-0.577
(0.363)
-1.180
(0.558)
GDP
0.348
(0.152)
0.213
(0.316)
-0.059
(0.484)
obs. 170 170 170 170
Notes: see table 9.
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Table 13
Spatial spill-overs: provinces (border-sharing)
Electricity use
total business services
(13.1) (13.2) (13.3)
 rt
0.156
(0.084)
0.205
(0.105)
0.180
(0.065)
lrt
0.118
(0.052)
0.003
(0.068)
-0.102
(0.048)elrt 0.066(0.106) 0.091(0.134) -0.085(0.112)
population
0.486
(0.439)
0.364
(0.558)
-0.234
(0.349)
elderly share
-0.521
(0.196)
-0.662
(0.248)
-0.155
(0.257)
GDP
0.498
(0.314)
0.670
(0.390)
-0.305
(0.222)
obs. 930 930 930
Notes: see table 3.
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Table 14
Spatial spill-overs: provinces (cross-region)
Electricity use
total business services
(14.1) (14.2) (14.3)
 rt
0.135
(0.067)
0.193
(0.084)
0.138
(0.056)
lrt
0.040
(0.044)
0.031
(0.057)
-0.089
(0.048)e rt 0.151(0.096) 0.155(0.125) 0.212(0.127)elrt 0.195(0.298) 0.291(0.404) 0.093(0.286)
population
0.541
(0.392)
0.425
(0.494)
-0.146
(0.362)
elderly share
-0.512
(0.185)
-0.658
(0.238)
-0.134
(0.253)
GDP
0.446
(0.323)
0.402
(0.390)
-0.394
(0.208)
obs. 930 930 930
Notes: see table 3.
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